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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the international financial crisis in major developed economies, 
central banks of these countries implemented several monetary policy (MP) measures, oriented to 
stabilize the financial system and mitigate the effects on the real side of the economy. As more data 
on the recovery of US economy becomes available, the speech of FED authorities is turning to 
consider the rising of the FED fund rates (FFR), defined as “normalization”. The effects of the US MP 
normalization are unclear – mainly for economies with low degrees of financial development – 
since the reversion of a monetary policy to a pre-crisis stance would take place under a US growth 
scenario. We estimate the impact of the normalization on Central America and the Dominican 
economies, summarizing the information of nearly 80 variables in a few common factors and 
considering both effects through real and financial channels. We estimate a factor augmented VAR, 
to measure the impact of US MP shocks to these economies, using a sign restriction approach in the 
identification process of such shocks. Then we use measured shocks to map the effects on domestic 
variables. Our results indicate that this eventuality will affect these economies mostly through its 
effects on the real side of the economy due to its impact on external demand and the reduced role of 
exchange rate as a shock absorber, where countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes being 
more affected. On the financial side, domestic interest rate will rise and net international reserves 
will fall, as central banks limit volatility in exchange rates. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In October 2014, the Federal Reserve (FED) decided to end six years of unconventional monetary 
policy, based on the US economic recovery and the stability of its financial markets. Throughout this 
period, the federal funds rate (FFR) – conventional monetary policy instrument – has stayed in 
historical low levels. The improvements in the labor market, as well as in real activity growth 
forecasts, have brought into the FED policy makers’ discussion the possibility of a period of interest 
rates hikes, to offset potential inflationary pressures in the policy horizon.  
This phenomenon, known as monetary policy normalization, is considered an important topic 
among policy makers, given that a sharp increase could raise financial market volatility. This 
reopens the question of how US monetary policy shocks spillover to rest of the world, currently in a 
context of historically low interest rates levels.  
The main objective of this paper is to quantify the effects of foreign interest rate shocks, measured 
through the US FFR, to the Central American and Dominican (CADR) economies. This is a relevant 
subject for policy makers in these economies, because of the important commercial linkage of CARD 
countries with the US economy, despite the low degree of financial development relative to other 
Emerging Market Economies in Latin America (LA). 
The empirical strategy to study this phenomenon intends to measure the country-specific effects of 
US monetary policy shocks. The measurement of the impact induced by US monetary shocks in 
other countries is subject to the problem of identification of such shocks (Canova and De Nicoló 
(2000), Kim (2001) and Canova (2005)). We address this problem using sign restrictions to identify 
the effects of a US MP shock by a rise of the FFR. While the FFR has remained unchanged for the last 
seven years, the FED has employed nonconventional instruments, such as quantitative easing (QE), 
which have led to a more expansive monetary policy than what can be accounted by the effective 
FFR. Therefore, in order to address this issue, we use the Shadow Federal Funds Rate (Wu-Xia, 
2014) as our measure of monetary policy instrument.  
We estimate a Factor Augmented Autorregresive model (FAVAR) with a foreign variables block, 
where the US is the relevant foreign country for these economies. Common factors are extracted 
from a country data set of nearly 80 macroeconomic variables of CARD3 countries, for the period 
2003 - 2014.  
Other papers have used the FAVAR methodology to study the international transmission of 
monetary policy shocks. Mumtaz and Surico (2007) extend the model of Bernanke, Boivin and 
Eliasz (2004) to the open economy case, analyzing the transmission to seventeen industrial 
countries. Meanwhile, Zuniga (2011) studies the effects of a change in the US monetary policy for 
the Mexican and Brazilian case. To date, this is one of the first works that addresses the US 
monetary policy effects for Central American and Dominican economies.  
Summarizing the main findings, US monetary shocks have contractive effects on these economies.  
The relative importance of exchange rate stability minimizes the response of this variable, hence 
raising interest rates and falling net international reserves do most of the adjustment. On the real 
side, exports fall due to the dominance of the income absorption effect over the expenditure 
switching effect, backed on the limited fluctuation in exchange rates. However, a recover in trade 
balance is observed, as imports decrease more than exports. Finally, remittances, which are an 
important source of non-labor income in these economies, respond negatively. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the 
empirical strategies. Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 compares the results for a positive 
interest rate shock to main Central American and Dominican indicators. Section 6 concludes.  
II. Literature Review 
Literature related to conventional monetary shocks, measured through interest rate changes, 
although extensive, focuses in “normal times”, i.e. periods that do not include hyperinflation 
episodes, currency crises, or massive recessions (Canova, 2005). When studying monetary shocks 
and its international transmission, two empirical strategies can be distinguished: those based on 
theoretical models with imposed restrictions, and those which are data oriented, based on 
empirical relations.  
In theoretical models, such as the Mundell-Fleming model and the Obstfeld-Rogoff extension 
(1996), the transmission of monetary shocks to other economies occurs through two main 
channels: current account and exchange rate.  
                                                          
3 Nicaragua is excluded from the sample, due to lack of data prior to 2007. 
A tightening shock in the country of origin is associated with a fall in output and an appreciation of 
the currency of that country. However, the impact of that shock to other countries is ambiguous, 
since two offsetting mechanisms work simultaneously, with no clear evidence of which one would 
dominate: on one side, the exchange rate in the foreign country depreciates, having a positive 
effects on economic activity (expenditure switching effect); meanwhile, the interest rate hike 
shrinks domestic output in the country of origin, leading to a fall in the demand for exports of 
foreign countries (income absorption effect)(Kawai, 2015). Likewise, inter-temporal models also 
show ambiguous results, even after including future expectations from economic agents as an 
additional mechanism (Kim, 2000).  
Empirical models (Lastrapes (1992), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Grilli and Roubini (1995), Kim 
and Roubini (2000), and Clarida and Gali (1994)) employ strategies that minimize restrictions, 
using data to identify transmission mechanisms for the exchange rate case. Kim (2000) compares 
the empirical results with different theoretical models, finding that an expansive monetary shock in 
US, measured by a drop in the world interest rate, has a positive effect on growth for G-6 
economies, which matches with the results suggested by inter-temporal models (Svensson and Van 
Wijnbergen (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)). Also, the trade link is not significant, which is not 
consistent with the “beggar-thy-neighbor” theory of the MFD basic model.  The paper concludes 
that the exchange rate response does not depend on whether the identifying strategies are 
recursive or not, as prompted by Kim and Roubini (2000) and Cushman and Zha (1997). Other 
findings of Kim (2000) include the exogeneity of US to non-US monetary policy.  
The international transmission of monetary shocks to industrial countries has been recently 
addressed by Vespignani (2014). Mumtaz and Surico (2007) explore the effects of a decrease in the 
international short term interest rates on the United Kingdom, finding a positive impact on GDP, 
investment and consumption after a year. Likewise, the study of Jannsen and Klein (1991) finds 
that an increase in a foreign interest rate (Euro Zone, in this case) has a positive impact on domestic 
interest rates for a set of countries that have not adopted the euro4. The increase in the interest 
rates translates into a contraction in GDP, through a reduction in imports. Meanwhile, exports 
decline, exposing the importance of the income absorption effect in these economies. Since both 
exports and imports decline, no significant changes are observed in the trade balance. The response 
of these variables, as well as the negligible role observed in the exchange rate, is similar to the 
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 The set of countries include the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. 
reaction of countries with a fixed exchange rate regime, revealing the importance of exchange rate 
stabilization for these small open economies.  
For developing economies, the degree of transmission of international monetary shocks varies 
according to the currency regime, macroeconomic fundamentals and country-specific structural 
characteristics (Borda and Montauban (1999), Arora and Cerisola (2001), Mackowiack (2001) and 
Canova (2005), and Zuniga (2011)5). These authors identify, through different VAR specifications, 
two key transmission channels: trade balance and interest rates.  
The research of Borda et al. (2000), related to the contribution of US monetary policy to Caribbean 
business cycles, concludes that for countries with a flexible exchange rate regime, a world interest 
rate shock has a negative effect on output due to an increase in the real exchange rate that 
augments the cost of inputs. However, it indicates that GDP for Caribbean countries is not mainly 
driven by the world interest rate, but rather by the exchange rate, highlighted as an important 
transmission mechanism. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Mackowiak (2001), 
where the typical response of an emerging market economy to a tightening of the US monetary 
policy is exchange rate depreciation, inflation and a fall in economic activity.6 Meanwhile, the 
results provided by Canova (2005) suggest that the interest rate channel serves as an amplifier of 
US monetary changes, conferring the trade channel an insignificant role in the transmission of 
monetary shocks from US to LA.  
The normalization of monetary policy focusing on the impact of unconventional instruments 
adopted by industrial countries after the 2007 international crisis has been approached by different 
authors. Hausman and Wongswan (2006), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), Neely (2013), Londono 
(2014) and Chen, Mancini-Griffoli & Sahay (2014) analyze its spillover effects to emerging 
economies. Overall, their results confer a more important role to financial linkages and trade 
channel.  
Hausman and Wongswan (2006) explore the channels of US monetary policy transmission through 
the Federal Open Market Committee announcements, noting that a country with a higher degree of 
real and financial integration with the US has a greater interest-rate response, as well as those with 
less flexible exchange rates. In summary, unlike Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), they suggest that 
real and financial linkages with the US are more important than real and financial linkages with the 
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Chile. 
rest of the world. Likewise, Neely (2013) distinguishes the relative importance of the signaling and 
portfolio balance channels to explain the contribution of unconventional policy to the reduction of 
bond yields in most countries after the international crisis of 2007. 7 Through a dynamic term 
structure model, they conclude that both channels are important. 8 Nonetheless, Chen et al. (2014) 
indicate that the spillovers to asset prices and capital markets are larger if they come from signal 
surprises. They highlight that even if unconventional monetary policies have a greater impact than 
conventional ones, characteristics such as better fundamentals and a more liquid market structure 
help to mitigate the effects. Londono (2014) also demonstrates that although fluctuations of asset 
prices in emerging markets – after a US monetary shock – are bigger than fluctuations in the 
country of origin (US), weaker fundamentals explains, in part, this overreaction. Among other 
studies that focus on the effects of unconventional monetary policy to other countries are Craine & 
Martin (2008) and Hausman & Wongswan (2011).  
III. Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section we describe the empirical strategy used to pin down the potential effects of US 
monetary policy shocks on CARD economies and the underlying transmission mechanisms. For this 
aim, we utilize a multi-sectorial dataset of about 80 variables, which sum up the macroeconomic 
information of CARD countries, to estimate common factors through Principal Components. The 
common factors are used as indicators of the state of the economy for CARD economies. For a 
proper identification of US monetary shocks, we employ sign restrictions for the US variables.  
Hence, our empirical strategy consists of a FAVAR approach with a sign-restriction identification of 
US monetary policy shock, where factors included are principal components. This methodology – 
introduced to forecasters by Stock and Watson (2002) and to macroeconomics by Bernanke, Boivin 
and Eliasz (2004) – extracts from a large set of data a smaller group of factors that drive the 
dynamics of the whole sample. This mechanism allows the researcher to summarize “big data” 
neatly, avoiding the “curse of dimensionality”, while at the same time accounting for the crucial 
information. 
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8 The signal channel is more important for countries with strong response to conventional monetary policy 
surprises in the US; and the portfolio balance is consistent with the degree of substitution of international 
bonds between countries. 
The Principal Components Analysis extracts a series of factors from N number of variables, which 
are linear combination of this data set and attempts to:  a) minimizes noise, since the extracted 
factors contain the most important information, leaving aside noisy deviations and b) minimizes 
redundancy: two factors should not contain the same “information” from the dataset, but should 
express different dimensions along which the data varies. After these factors have been estimated, 
we perform a VAR analysis. We use Bayesian methods to estimate VAR coefficients and impose 
sign-restriction on the impulse response functions for the identification of US MP shocks. 
Suppose we have M number of series spanning T periods, collected in Mx1 vectors    , from which 
we extract N factors spanning the same T periods in an Nx1 vector   . Our model is divided in two 
parts. First, the measurement equation is: 
        
 where the matrix   is MxN. Its elements are called factor loadings; these associate the value of the 
factors to the measured variables of the model.     is the error term with mean zero and covariance 
matrix . 
The second part of the model is the state equation, which is simply a VAR with sign restrictions 
containing one block for the exogenous external variables (  ), the Volatility Index (VIX) to capture 
financial conditions in these economies and one for the estimated domestic factors (  ), which 
Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2004) named Factor Augmented VAR: 
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Here,    includes the FFR and a set of foreign variables such as US output growth, US inflation rate, 
and US Real Balances growth. It is important to note that we restrict the foreign variables as 
exogenous, imposing zero coefficients restrictions ( ̃).    is the error term with mean zero and 
covariance matrix .  
The estimation procedure for the factors is non-parametric, as it is done through a matrix 
decomposition of the data called singular value decomposition (SVD) of the data matrix, from which 
we obtain the coefficients of the linear combination of the data that composes our factors. Thus we 
obtain the N series of factors.  
Therefore, to assess the dynamic responses of the measurement variables to foreign interest shocks 
we can simply compute the VAR in the state equation, and induce a shock to the    variable, to 
obtain vectors of responses of each of the variables of the VAR into the simulated response. Then, 
with the factor loadings from the measurement equation we can associate these responses of the 
factors and the monetary policy variable to the responses of each of the measured variables in   . 
Clearly, if the response of a variable    periods in the future to a shock of   in period   is denoted as 
 ̂   , where ̂   could be a vector (for the factors) or a scalar (for the monetary policy variable), 
then we would compute the responses of the measurement variables with: 
 ̂      ̂    
Now, regarding the transmission of monetary shocks, the literature has employed sign-restrictions 
as an identifying strategy, imposing restrictions that agree with a priori theory. Hence, a 
contractionary interest rate shock leads to a fall in output9, diminishing inflation pressures, 
whereas exchange rate appreciates, as expected from theoretical models.  
We rely on this strategy10 popularized by Canova and De Nicoló (2002), Uhlig (2005) and Gertler 
and Karadi (2014) for our identification strategy. Our goal is to estimate shocks of models that 
produce the expected response of US variables to exogenous monetary policy movements. In 
particular, we impose the following sign restrictions in the spirit of Canova and De Nicoló (2002), 
where prices are sluggish and output has a lagged response to monetary innovations. As in Uhlig 
(2005), we limit sign restrictions on the impulse responses to provide a “minimalistic 
identification”. We impose restrictions only on impact, where the horizon for the sign restriction to 
hold is one period, thus: 
FFR >0, t=1 
IP growth<0, t=2 
CPI inflation <0, t=2 
Real balance growth<0, t=2 
where   denotes the period in months where the sign restriction is imposed.  
                                                          
9 Uhlig (2005) employs an agnostic identification procedure to study the effects of monetary policy on output. He finds no 
clear effect of interest rate hikes on real GDP. 
10
 However, as emphasized by Fry and Pagan (2011), we recognize the multiple model issue arising from the 
transformations of the new set of structural shocks.  
 IV. Data Description 
In this section we describe the statistical data used in the estimation, where all the information is 
monthly frequency. We take a broad sample of data, consisting of the main macroeconomic 
indicators for a set of small open economies: Costa Rica (CR), El Salvador (ES), Honduras (HN), 
Guatemala (GT), Nicaragua (NI) and the Dominican Republic (DR). The complete set of variables 
and the transformations performed are shown in Appendix A. All variables are expressed in twelve 
month variation, and standardized subtracting the sample mean and divided by the sample 
standard deviation. 
We divide the dataset into three main groups:  
a. Real Indicators 
This group contains variables from the real sector of the economy, i.e. real activity indicators11, 
exports, imports, trade balance and remittances; all in real terms. From the fiscal sector, we 
incorporate total fiscal revenue and expenditure. By including this group, we aim to capture the 
varying responses across sectors and periods to economic cycles, and how they might respond 
differently to a foreign interest shocks. 
b. Prices and relative prices 
This group consists of real exchange rates, consumer price indexes (CPI) and food and beverage CPI 
components. This last variable is included due to its relative importance in explaining domestic 
inflation. Finally, nominal exchange rates (local currency price of US dollar) are included. 
c. Financial and monetary sector indicators 
This set is composed of several measures of interest rates, including lending and deposit rates – in 
nominal and real terms –estimated using observed inflation. We also include credit growth to the 
private sector in real terms, as an indicator of the business cycle. Finally, to capture the overall 
evolution of money supply, we include traditional monetary aggregates. 
In order to properly measure the impact of foreign interest rates on these economies, we must first 
identify the US MP shocks. For this purpose, we consider the US CPI, US Industrial Production Index 
(IPI), and Real Balances (M1), which are the typical set of variables used to analyze the impact of 
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MP shock in the US (Sims (1992)). As for the measure of US monetary policy instrument, the 
effective FFR has remained unchanged for the last seven years. Nonetheless, the FED has employed 
nonconventional instruments, such as quantitative easing (QE), which have led to a more expansive 
monetary policy than what can be accounted by the effective FFR. Therefore, in order to address 
this issue, we consider the Wu-Xia Shadow Federal Funds Rate as our measure of monetary policy 
instrument (Wu and Xia, 2014). 
We also consider the Volatility Index (VIX), as a measure of regional risk premium. 
V. Results 
In this section we discuss the response of domestic variables to a foreign interest rate innovation, 
measured by a one-time 25 basis point unexpected increase to the shadow FFR, our proxy of 
monetary policy rate in the US. Table 1 summarizes the qualitative response of macroeconomic 
variables for each economy. Complete results in terms of impulse response function are shown in 
Appendix B12. 
Table 1. Results Overview 
Variables Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Dominican 
Republic 
Output ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Exports ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Imports ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Trade Balance ↑ - ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Remittances ↓ ↓ - ↓ ↓ 
CPI Inflation ↓ - - ↓ ↑ 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
- - - - - 
Nominal 
Exchange Rate 
- 
 
- - - 
Net 
International 
Reserves 
↓ - ↑ ↓ ↓ 
M1 ↓ ↓ - ↓ ↓ 
Private Credit ↓ - - ↓ ↓ 
Interest Rate ↑ - ↑ ↑ ↑ 
EMBI   ↑     ↑ 
 
                                                          
12 In Appendix B we also include impulse responses assuming a recursive identification strategy using 
Cholesky decomposition. The problems to identify monetary policy shocks arise when such approach is used. 
According to the estimated impulse response functions, a positive shock to the FFR has a negative 
impact on main real domestic variables. For all countries under analysis, output, export and import 
growth rates fall. In addition, financial sector variables such as interest rates and risk premium 
increase, also money and credit demand decrease. There is no evidence of significant nominal and 
real exchange rates adjustment to the shock, while we find a decrease in international reserves for 
three of these economies. 
The empirical literature of transmission mechanisms of US monetary policy shocks (see Canova, 
2000) emphasizes the role of exchange rate regime and the degree of financial integration on the 
magnitude of the pass-through to domestic macroeconomic variables (real and nominal) of these 
type of innovations. Therefore, countries with flexible (less-flexible) exchange rates regimes and 
relative high (low) integrated financial markets show less (more) volatility in domestic variables 
such as output and interest rates.  
 
One of the peculiarities of these economies is the importance of exchange rate stability as a policy 
objective. Despite that impulse response results suggest depreciation pressures after foreign 
interest shock in CR, GT, and HN, they are statistically not significant. Instead, data suggest Central 
Banks react to the external shock by increasing interest rates across all countries and reducing net 
foreign reserves in CR, HN and the DR. Risk premium raises in ES and the DR13. Likewise, positive 
inflation pressures are not observed due to interest rate reaction and thus a limited pass-through 
effect. 
 
On the real side, our results show a negative effect on output growth. Similarly, export and import 
growth falls in all countries. These results are in line with Jannsen and Klein (2011) which 
emphasize the importance of income absorption effect over the expenditure switching effect in 
countries with active exchange rate policies oriented to stabilize this variable. Nevertheless, the fall 
in import growth exceeds the fall in exports; as a result trade balance improves for most countries 
considered, excluding ES. This finding is opposite to the prediction from theoretical open economy 
DSGE literature, such as Gali and Monacelli (2005) where the real depreciation induced by a foreign 
interest rate shock, trigger an export increase. Behind this theoretical transmission mechanism is 
the assumption of relative flexibility in exchange rate markets. 
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Finally, the flow of remittances is negatively affected in all countries (excluding GT where the 
response is negative, but insignificant). Remittances are an important source of non-labor income 
in countries like ES, HN, NI and in less degree in the DR. Therefore, it becomes a relevant 
transmission channel of foreign shock transmission. 
VI. Conclusion  
 
In this document we analyzed the impact of an eventual normalization of US monetary policy on the 
developing economies of Central America and the Dominican Republic. As we mentioned, these 
economies differentiate from other emerging economies in their lower financial deepening and 
their less exposure to capital flows. 
Using a panel of macroeconomic variables which includes real sector and monetary indicators, we 
identify the transmission mechanism of foreign (US) interest rate shocks to the domestic economy. 
Impulse response analysis suggests that this type of shock pushes down real output, exports and 
imports. In addition, a US monetary policy shock will have low impact on nominal exchange rates, at 
the cost of increasing interest rates, falling net international reserves and rising risk premium.  
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Appendix A – Data Description 
All series were directly taken from Consejo Monetario Centroamericano/Secretaría Ejecutiva 
Database, except for the Miscellaneous series (sources at the end of the Appendix). Format is 
presented as follows: series name; data span and series description as appears in the database. 
Nominal variables, except NER and Interest Rates, were CPI deflated. As for the transformation, the 
interest rates are presented as year-over-year first-difference values. The rest were one year 
logged-differentiated.  All transformed variables are mean-de-trended and expressed in terms of 
their standard deviation. 
Real Sector 
    
     1. IMAE_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONTHLY INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE): TREND-CYCLE, INDEX - COSTA RICA 
2. IMAE_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONTHLY INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE) : TREND-CYCLE, INDEX - EL SALVADOR 
3. IMAE_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONTHLY INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE) : TREND-CYCLE, INDEX - GUATEMALA 
4. IMAE_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONTHLY INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE) : TREND-CYCLE, INDEX - HONDURAS 
5. IMAE_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
MONTHLY INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE) : TREND-CYCLE, INDEX - NICARAGUA 
6. IMAE_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONTHLY INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IMAE) : TREND-CYCLE, INDEX - DR 
 7.EXPORTS_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - COSTA RICA 
8.EXPORTS_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - EL SALVADOR 
9.EXPORTS_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB  - GUATEMALA 
10.EXPORTS_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - HONDURAS 
11.EXPORTS_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - NICARAGUA 
12.EXPORTS_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - DR 
 13.IMPORTS_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
IMPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - COSTA RICA 
14.IMPORTS_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
IMPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - EL SALVADOR 
15.IMPORTS_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
IMPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB  - GUATEMALA 
16.IMPORTS_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
IMPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US,TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - HONDURAS 
17.IMPORTS_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
IMPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US,TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - NICARAGUA 
18.IMPORTS_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
IMPORTS OF GOODS: MILLIONS OF $US, TOTAL  MAQUILA WITHOUT MAQUILA ,FOB - DR 
 19.REMESAS_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REMITTANCES INCOME: MILLIONS OF $US- COSTA RICA 
 20.REMESAS_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REMITTANCES INCOME: MILLIONS OF $US- EL SALVADOR 
 21.REMESAS_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REMITTANCES INCOME: MILLIONS OF $US - GUATEMALA 
 22.REMESAS_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REMITTANCES INCOME: MILLIONS OF $US- HONDURAS 
 23.REMESAS_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
REMITTANCES INCOME: MILLIONS OF $US- NICARAGUA 
 24.REMESAS_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REMITTANCES INCOME: MILLIONS OF $US- DR 
 25.CCO_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TRADE BALANCE: MILLIONS OF $US- COSTA RICA 
 26.CCO_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TRADE BALANCE: MILLIONS OF $US- EL SALVADOR 
 27.CCO_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TRADE BALANCE: MILLIONS OF $US - GUATEMALA 
 28.CCO_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TRADE BALANCE: MILLIONS OF $US- HONDURAS 
 29.CCO_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
TRADE BALANCE: MILLIONS OF $US- NICARAGUA 
 30.CCO_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TRADE BALANCE: MILLIONS OF $US- DR 
 
     Exchange Rate 
    
     31.TCR_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE- COSTA RICA 
 32.TCR_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE- EL SALVADOR 
 33.TCR_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE - GUATEMALA 
 34.TCR_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE- HONDURAS 
 36.TCR_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE- DR 
 37.TCN_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOCAL CURRENCY PER $US- COSTA RICA 
 38.TCN_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOCAL CURRENCY PER $US- EL SALVADOR 
 39.TCN_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOCAL CURRENCY PER $US - GUATEMALA 
 40.TCN_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOCAL CURRENCY PER $US- HONDURAS 
 41.TCN_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOCAL CURRENCY PER $US- NICARAGUA 
 42.TCN_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: LOCAL CURRENCY PER $US- DR 
  
 
 
 
 
     
 
   
Money and credit quantity aggregates 
     43.BMA_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
BROAD MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 44.BMA_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
BROAD MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 45.BMA_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
BROAD MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 46.BMA_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
BROAD MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 47.BMA_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
BROAD MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 48.BMA_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
BROAD MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 49.BMR_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NARROW MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 50.BMR_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NARROW MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 51.BMR_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NARROW MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 52.BMR_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NARROW MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 53.BMR_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
NARROW MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 54.BMR_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NARROW MONETARY BASE: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 55.M1_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONETARY AGGREGATE M1: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 56.M1_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONETARY AGGREGATE M1: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 57.M1_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONETARY AGGREGATE M1: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 58.M1_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONETARY AGGREGATE M1: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 59.M1_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
MONETARY AGGREGATE M1: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 60.M1_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
MONETARY AGGREGATE M1: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 61.DEPOS_TRANSF_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
DEPOSITS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 62.DEPOS_TRANSF_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
DEPOSITS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 63.DEPOS_TRANSF_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
DEPOSITS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 64.DEPOS_TRANSF_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
DEPOSITS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 65.DEPOS_TRANSF_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
DEPOSITS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 66.DEPOS_TRANSF_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
DEPOSITS IN NATIONAL CURRENCY: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 67.BILLETES_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 68.BILLETES_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 69.BILLETES_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 70.BILLETES_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 71.BILLETES_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 72.BILLETES_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 73.RIN_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: MILLIONS OF $US- COSTA RICA 
 74.RIN_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: MILLIONS OF $US- EL SALVADOR 
 75.RIN_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: MILLIONS OF $US - GUATEMALA 
 76.RIN_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: MILLIONS OF $US- HONDURAS 
 77.RIN_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: MILLIONS OF $US- NICARAGUA 
 78.RIN_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: MILLIONS OF $US- DR 
 79.CREDITO_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 80.CREDITO_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 81.CREDITO_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 82.CREDITO_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 83.CREDITO_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 84.CREDITO_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 85.CREDITOPUB_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PUBLIC SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 86.CREDITOPUB_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PUBLIC SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 87.CREDITOPUB_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PUBLIC SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 88.CREDITOPUB_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PUBLIC SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 89.CREDITOPUB_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PUBLIC SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 90.CREDITOPUB_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PUBLIC SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 91.CREDITOPRIV_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PRIVATE SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 92.CREDITOPRIV_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PRIVATE SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 93.CREDITOPRIV_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PRIVATE SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 94.CREDITOPRIV_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PRIVATE SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 95.CREDITOPRIV_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PRIVATE SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 96.CREDITOPRIV_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CREDIT: PRIVATE SECTOR, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 97.CREDITOEXT_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TOTAL CREDIT TO NON-RESIDENTS AND OTHER: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
98.CREDITOEXT_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TOTAL CREDIT TO NON-RESIDENTS AND OTHER: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
99.CREDITOEXT_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TOTAL CREDIT TO NON-RESIDENTS AND OTHER: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
100.CREDITOEXT_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TOTAL CREDIT TO NON-RESIDENTS AND OTHER: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
101.CREDITOEXT_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
TOTAL CREDIT TO NON-RESIDENTS AND OTHER: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
102.CREDITOEXT_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
TOTAL CREDIT TO NON-RESIDENTS AND OTHER: MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
  
Interest Rates 
    
     103.TASA_ACTIVA_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, LENDING (PER ANNUM)- COSTA RICA 
 104.TASA_ACTIVA_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, LENDING (PER ANNUM)- EL SALVADOR 
 105.TASA_ACTIVA_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, LENDING (PER ANNUM) - GUATEMALA 
 106.TASA_ACTIVA_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, LENDING (PER ANNUM)- HONDURAS 
 107.TASA_ACTIVA_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, LENDING (PER ANNUM)- NICARAGUA 
 
108.TASA_ACTIVA_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, LENDING (PER ANNUM)- DR 
 109.TASA_PASIVA_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- COSTA RICA 
 110.TASA_PASIVA_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, DEPOSIT(PER ANNUM)- EL SALVADOR 
 111.TASA_PASIVA_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM) - GUATEMALA 
 112.TASA_PASIVA_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- HONDURAS 
 113.TASA_PASIVA_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- NICARAGUA 
 114.TASA_PASIVA_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: NOMINAL, DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- DR 
 115.TASA_RACTIVA_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM)- COSTA RICA 
 116.TASA_RACTIVA_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM)- EL SALVADOR 
 117.TASA_RACTIVA_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM) - GUATEMALA 
 118.TASA_RACTIVA_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM)- HONDURAS 
 119.TASA_RACTIVA_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM)- NICARAGUA 
 120.TASA_RACTIVA_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM)- DR 
 121.TASA_RPASIVA_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL LENDING (PER ANNUM)- COSTA RICA 
 122.TASA_RPASIVA_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- EL SALVADOR 
 123.TASA_RPASIVA_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM) - GUATEMALA 
 124.TASA_RPASIVA_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- HONDURAS 
 125.TASA_RPASIVA_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- NICARAGUA 
 126.TASA_RPASIVA_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
INTEREST RATE: REAL DEPOSIT (PER ANNUM)- DR 
 
     Fiscal Balance 
    
     127.ING_FISCALES_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT INCOME: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 128.ING_FISCALES_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT INCOME: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 129.ING_FISCALES_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT INCOME: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 130.ING_FISCALES_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT INCOME: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 131.ING_FISCALES_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT INCOME: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 132.ING_FISCALES_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT INCOME: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 133.GASTOS_FISCALES_CR 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- COSTA RICA 
 134.GASTOS_FISCALES_SV 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- EL SALVADOR 
 135.GASTOS_FISCALES_G 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY - GUATEMALA 
 136.GASTOS_FISCALES_H 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- HONDURAS 
 137.GASTOS_FISCALES_N 2009M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- NICARAGUA 
 138.GASTOS_FISCALES_RD 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: TOTAL, MILLIONS OF LOCAL CURRENCY- DR 
 
     Miscellaneous  
    
     139.EMBI_SV* 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EMERGING MARKET BOND INDEX (JP MORGAN CHASE)- EL SALVADOR 
 140.EMBI_RD* 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
EMERGING MARKET BOND INDEX (JP MORGAN CHASE)- DR 
 141.EMBI_LATINO* 1980M01: 2014M12 
 
EMERGING MARKET BOND INDEX (JP MORGAN CHASE) - LATIN 
 
142.PETR_FMI** 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
CRUDE OIL (PETROLEUM), PRICE INDEX, 2005 = 100, SIMPLE AVERAGE OF THREE SPOT 
PRICES; DATED BRENT, WEST TEXAS INTERMEDIATE, AND THE DUBAI FATEH 
 143.PETR** 2003M01: 2014M12 
 
PETROLEUM PRICE: END OF PERIOD, US$ PER BARREL  
 144.US_CPI_SA*** 1980M01: 2014M12 
 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR ALL URBAN CONSUMERS: ALL ITEMS - USA 
 145.FFR**** 1980M01: 2014M12 
 
EFFECTIVE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE (NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED) - USA 
 146.US_IP_SA**** 1980M01: 2014M12 
 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX(2007=100) - USA 
 147. US_M1**** 1980M01: 2014M12 
 
M1 MONEY STOCK, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED - USA 
 
     Sources: * JP Morgan Chase; ** International Monetary Fund; *** Bureau of Labor Statistics; **** FRED 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B – Impulse Response Functions Figures  
1.a FAVAR with Sign Restrictions 
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* All results are expressed in terms of a 25-basis points shock to the Wu-Xia Shadow FFR.   
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* All results are expressed in terms of a 25-basis points shock to the Wu-Xia Shadow FFR.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.b Cholesky Decomposition 
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* All results are expressed in terms of a 25-basis points shock to the Wu-Xia Shadow FFR.   
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* All results are expressed in terms of a 25-basis points shock to the Wu-Xia Shadow FFR.   
 
